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EXAMINING THE OUTER-LIMITS OF
TRADEMARK LAW IN THE RELIGIOUS
CONTEXT AND A POTENTIAL IMPLICIT
BIAS FOR NON-SECULAR LITIGANTS:
ELLER V. INTELLECTUAL RESERVE,
INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
What sorts of words, names, and symbols generally come to
mind when you hear the word "trademark?" Coca-Cola, the Nike
Swoosh, the iconic Mercedes-Benz three-point star and Mr. Pea-
nut, just to name a few. How about the Star of David? The cruci-
fix? The word "Catholic," or an image of the Vatican? What
about the Islamic Star and Crescent or a picture of the Buddha?
Typically, these words and symbols are not the first to enter your
mind when you think about trademarks. Despite any initial mis-
givings these devices are, in theory, eligible for trademark protec-
tion. As source identifiers, these images, symbols, and words may
signify where they come from and who produces them: the reli-
gious organization with which they are affiliated.
Can religious organizations own valid trademarks in commonly
used and recognized devices? At what point does the exclusive
use of such terms by such religious organization pass the outer-
limits of protection afforded to religious marks and become not
protectable? Do the courts that are responsible for fairly applying
the law as it stands to all litigants, evenhandedly apply trademark
law to secular as well as non-secular parties? Or is there a more
cautious attitude present within certain circuits in regards to the
evidentiary burdens such circuits are willing to place on religious
organizations in the trademark context?
Eller v. Intellectual Reserve raises these issues and provides a
looking glass through which to analyze the outer-limits of trade-
mark law as applied in a religious context. Eller pits a small busi-
ness owner in his attempts to bring together people of the Mormon
faith against the corporate entity responsible for the intellectual
property holdings of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
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Saints (hereinafter "Mormon Church"). Eller touches on im-
portant issues surrounding the role of trademark law as it relates to
religious words and symbols. Additionally, Eller brings issues the
outer-limits of trademark law in the religious symbol context to the
forefront. This article uses Eller as a guide for analytic discussion
of the boundaries and outer-limits of trademark law in the religious
context; further, it will examine whether there is a tendency among
certain courts to lessen evidentiary burdens for non-secular trade-
mark litigants.
Section II of this article discusses the background in this realm
of case law examining trademark in the religious context, begin-
ning with the Lanham Act, the federal statute governing trademark
law; it will then look at the qualifications a mark must meet to be-
come federally registerable, including the issue of becoming cer-
tain types of trademarks becoming generic. Section III provides a
brief discussion of the facts and procedural history of Eller. Sec-
tion IV analyzes the future implications of cases such as Eller and
the potential ramifications if the boundaries and outer-limits are
pushed to these lengths. Section V concludes the article by sum-
ming up the outer-limits of trademark law as they stand today, and
urge that public policy calls for a more conservative outer-limit of
trademark law in this context and a more fair treatment for secular
and non-secular litigants.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A mark performs a trademark function when the mark distin-
guishes a producer's goods or products from other goods and ser-
vices in the marketplace, and in order for a word, name, symbol, or
other device to become (and remain) a valid trademark, the mark
must perform and continue to perform such a function.' When de-
termining whether a mark performs a trademark function for typi-
cal consumer goods, it is often a relatively simple question to an-
swer.2 Does the word, name, symbol, or device signal to the
1. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:1
(2d ed. 1984).
2. For example, when a consumer sees the Coca-Cola trademark, that con-
sumer knows that the red, cursive text and distinctive bottle are distinguishing
210
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consumer who is the producer of the goods? Think back to the ex-
amples listed in the introduction; each of those marks tells poten-
tial consumers where these products come from. However, when
the goods or services enter the realm of the atypical, such as a reli-
gious mark, the answer to this question is not so black and white. It
may be more difficult for the courts to ascertain whether a mark is
actually performing a trademark function, as required by the Lan-
ham Act.
A. The Lanham Act
Federal trademark law is governed by the Lanham Act (herein-
after "Act")3. Section 45 of the Act defines a trademark as "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' used
or intended to be used in commerce as a way to identify and dis-
tinguish goods of one producer of such goods from those manufac-
tured, sold or produced by others, and to indicate the source of
such goods. 4 The Act provides a means of protection for the law-
ful owners of valid and federally registered marks against potential
wrongdoers or infringers. It facilitates this protection by prohibit-
ing infringing activity and providing private causes of action to
aggrieved trademark owners against any potential infringers. 5 A
holder of a federally registered trademark may institute a suit for
infringement against any person who uses any word, term, symbol,
this brand of soft drink from others in the market. The consumer knows that the
product found in this glass bottle is, in fact, Coca-Cola, and is signaled to this
fact by the product's distinctive trademarks.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
4. Id. § 1127.
5. Id. at § 1125(a)(1). The Act also provides a cause of action for trademark
dilution. It specifically defines two types of trademark dilution: dilution by blur-
ring and dilution by tarnishment. Id. § 1125(c). Dilution by blurring is associa-
tion of marks arising from the similarity between the mark and a famous mark
that lessens the distinctiveness of the famous mark. Id. § 1 125(c)(2)(B). The Act
enumerates several factors that the court may consider when assessing whether
dilution by blurring. Id. On the other hand, dilution by tamishment is associa-
tion between marks arising from the similarity between two marks that harms or
otherwise damages the reputation of the famous mark. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
However, this article will only focus on the cause of action for trademark in-
fringement and as such, a further discussion of dilution is not necessary.
3
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device, or any combination thereof in connection with goods and
services and in commerce which is "likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection" as
to the origin or source of the goods. 6
In order for a plaintiff to be successful in a trademark infringe-
ment claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate 1) that it owns a valid
mark that was entitled to protection under the Act, and 2) that the
defendant used a mark in commerce that was likely to cause con-
fusion among the consuming public as to the source or origin of
the defendant's mark.7 In assessing whether the defendant's use of
the mark is likely to cause confusion as to source or origin the
court analyzes the circumstances surrounding the alleged in-
fringement using a series of factors articulated by the reigning Cir-
cuit Court of the applicable jurisdiction.8 For example, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals applies the Roto-Rooter Factors to assess
this likelihood.9 Under the Roto-Rooter Factors, likelihood of con-
fusion is assessed by examining the following factors: 1) the type
of trademark at issue, 2) similarity of the marks, 3) similarity of
the product(s), 4) identity of retail outlets and purchasers, 5) type
of advertising used, 6) defendant's intent, and 7) actual confu-
6. Id. at § 1125(a)(1)(A).
7. Id. See also Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700,
702 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that a plaintiff alleging a cause of action for
trademark infringement must demonstrate that 1) it possesses a mark, 2) the de-
fendant used a mark, 3) defendant's use of the mark occurred in commerce, 4)
the defendant used the mark in connection with sale, offering for sale, distribu-
tion, or advertising of goods and services, and 5) the manner in which the de-
fendant used the mark is likely to confuse customers); CNA Fin. Corp. v.
Brown, 922 F. Supp. 567, 572 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff has es-
tablished a prima facie case of service mark infringement when it has proven
that 1) defendant used a term in commerce, 2) in connection with their services,
3) which is likely to cause confusion with 4) service marks rightfully owned and
used by plaintiff in connection with its services).
8. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1
(4th ed. 2014).
9. Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1975). Eller would
have been heard in the 5th Circuit's jurisdiction had it proceeded to trial and lat-
er appeal.
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sion.10 The court in Roto-Rooter emphasized that proof of actual
confusion is not necessary for a finding of likelihood of confusion,
but views the factor of actual confusion as the most important in
assessing the likelihood of confusion. "
B. Genericism
A generic term is one that refers to a product category in which
the particular product the mark purports to describe may be classi-
fied, and is therefore not distinctive in the trademark sense of the
word. 12 A mark may be deemed generic when the primary signifi-
cance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is the
product, not the producer.I3 In order to receive trademark protec-
tion, a mark must be distinctive, that is, it must perform a trade-
mark function in that it distinguishes a producer's goods and ser-
vices from other goods in the market place. 14A mark that is generic
receives no protection because it serves no trademark function. 5
A common test for determining whether a mark is generic, and
therefore ineligible for trademark protection, is the "Who Are
You-What Are You?" Test, derived from McCarthy's treatise and
10. Id. at 45. Although not specifically articulated in the Roto-Rooter case,
courts following the 5th Circuit Roto-Rooter test typically assess an eighth fac-
tor, level of consumer sophistication, when determining whether a likelihood of
confusion exists. See e.g. Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576
F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (Where the court held that the similarity between two
different eyelash extension marks were substantially similar enough to confuse
the sophisticated consumer).
11. Roto-Rooter, 513 F.2d at 45-46.
12. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
(1985).
13. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938); see also Liq-
uid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Controls Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1986)
(a trademark is supposed to identify the source of a product, whereas a generic
term "merely specifies the genus of which the particular product is a species.");
MCCARTHY, supra note 8, (noting that a generic name of a product can never
function as a trademark in that it does not indicate origin; the terms trademark
and generic are mutually exclusive).
14. MCCARTHY, supra note 8.
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
213
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adopted by numerous courts. 16 When a consumer asks the ques-
tions "Who are you? Where do you come from? Who made you?
Who vouches for you?" a mark is able to answer these questions
because it is performing a trademark function; identifying the
origin or the source of the goods. 17
A generic term answers the question "What are you?" because a
generic term is simply the name of a product category, and fails to
denote the origin of the goods.' 8 As a final note, a federally regis-
tered trademark may be cancelled at any time on the basis that it
has become generic, based on the reasoning that it is no longer per-
forming a trademark function.19
C. Development of Genericism and Likelihood
of Confusion in the Federal Courts
In order to fully grasp the issues and potential outcomes of Eller,
as well as the treatment of a religious trademark, it is essential to
examine the relevant case law in the trademark context, focusing
on cases in which courts determined either 1) whether or not a re-
ligious trademark had fallen prey to genericism, or 2) whether a
defendant's use of the plaintiffs religious trademark was likely to
cause confusion.
1. Generic Mark Analysis in the Religious Context
There have been several cases in the federal district courts as
well as in the Circuit Courts of Appeals that addressed the issue of
genericism regarding trademarks owned by religious organiza-
16. MCCARTHY, supra note 8.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. § 1064 (3) (A term that is generic does not perform a trademark function
because it no longer signals to the consumer the source of that product; instead,
it merely describes the product category in which the product belongs.) see e.g.,
Serv. Merch. Co. v. Serv. Jewelry Stores, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 983, 998 (S.D. Tex.
1990); Park N'FIy, supra note 12.
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tions.20 Whether the religious trademarks are found to be generic or
not is largely dependent on the facts of the case.
a. General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v.
McGill
In General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v.
McGill, the court held that the defendant had failed to establish
that the mark "SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST," was not generic,
and therefore protectable under the Lanham Act.21" In assessing
whether the marks were generic, the court applied a variation of
the classic test for genericism: "whether the public perceives the
term primarily as the designation of the article."22 In the religious
context of McGill, the court ultimately held that the test to be ap-
plied to generic religious marks was whether the general consum-
20. See General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617
F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010); General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists
v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1989);
Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Az. 1995) (holding that the
religious organization's trademark was not generic); Christian Science Bd. of
Dir. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347 (N.J.
1987).
21. McGill, 617 F. 3d at 415. The defendant in McGill was accused of in-
fringing the plaintiffs trademark based on his use of their purported mark
SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST in connection with advertising and other pro-
motions of his church, which were not affiliated with plaintiff's church. Id. at
404. The plaintiff had federally registered trademarks in the marks "Seventh-
day Adventist," "Adventist," and "General Conference of Seventh-day Advent-
ists." Id. at 405. The defendant had originally been a member of the plaintiff's
church but had separated himself from the church due to theological differences,
and formed his own church, which he called "A Creation Seventh Day & Ad-
ventist Church. Id.
22. Id. at 416. The defendant also referred to his church as the "Creation
Seventh Day Adventist Church" in the complaint. Id. at 405. The defendant
used the SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST mark on several advertisement and
promotional materials in connection with his nonaligned church, as well as in-
corporated the mark into several domain names associated with his church. Id.
at 405-06.
215
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ing public associates the contested mark with the religious beliefs
practiced by the church, or with the church itself 2 3
In examining these marks, the district court ruled that the
trademarks had become incontestable24 and were presumed valid
as a result. 25 When the defendant challenged the marks on the basis
that they had become generic, defendant now had the burden of
proving genericism, and barring trademark protection.26 Ultimately
the McGill court found that the defendant failed to meet this bur-
den. 27
The court found that evidence provided by the defendant was
not sufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiffs marks were gener-
ic.28 In its opinion, the court found that the plaintiffs marks were
not generic because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the
general public identified the mark SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST
23. Id. at 415 (quoting Bath & Body Works, Inc. v. Luzier Personalized
Cosmetics, Inc., 76 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 1996)). In arguing for the marks to
be deemed generic, the defendant asserted that the term "Seventh-day Advent-
ist" described a religion, and provided the following evidence to support his as-
sertions: 1) testimony from himself and a theology graduate student, 2) a dic-
tionary definition, 3) an entry from Wikipedia, 4) evidence of the plaintiffs
using "Seventh-day Adventist" as a noun rather than an adjective, and 5) evi-
dence of two additional "breakaway" churches using the term "Seventh-day
Adventist" in the names of their congregations. Id. at 415-16.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (2012) ("no incontestable right shall be acquired
in a mark which is the generic name for the goods or services or a portion there-
of, for which it is registered.").
25. McGill, 617 F.3d at 406.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 415.
28. Id. at 416. The court noted that the existence of other "breakaway"
churches using the mark did not help the defendant because this evidence sup-
ported the conclusion that the public would associate the term "Seventh-day
Adventist" with churches affiliated with the plaintiffs church, the exact oppo-
site of the proposition that the defendant was tasked with proving. Id. The court
also reasoned that the testimony offered by defendant and the graduate student
was not an accurate representation of the public's view, that the dictionary and
Wikipedia entries referenced the term "Adventist" and not "Seventh-day Ad-
ventist," and that the noun/adjective distinction was more applicable to an anal-
ysis regarding the descriptiveness of a mark (which is not grounds to challenge
an incontestable mark), rather than an analysis of the generic nature of a mark.
Id.
216
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as referring to certain religious beliefs, rather than the church it-
self29
McGill holds the position that for a religious trademark to be
generic, the party with the burden of proving genericism must
demonstrate that the public views the mark as reference to the
body of religious beliefs, rather than the specific church that touts
these religious beliefs.30 The test articulated in McGill appears to
be the court's interpretation of the traditional definition of a gener-
ic mark as specifically applied to the religious context; i.e. a mark
is generic if the consumer views the mark as identifying a particu-
lar kind of goods (a product) as opposed to being the producer of
said goods.3' In McGill, and in the broader religious context, the
"goods" are the religious beliefs, teachings, ideologies and the like
that are spread by the "source," (the religious organization). There-
fore, if the consumer sees the mark and identifies it with the reli-
gious beliefs, that mark is generic; on the other hand, if the mark is
associated with the religious organization itself, the mark has not
become generic.
b. General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v.
Seventh-Day Adventists Congregational Church
A case heard in the Ninth Circuit, General Conference Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventists Congregational
Church, applied a similar test to the one articulated in McGill.32
The plaintiff in General Conference sued for trademark infringe-
29. Id.
30. See id. When a mark has been registered with the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, the defendant in an infringement action has the burden of
proving that the mark is generic because the trademark has a presumption of va-
lidity. Reese Pub. Co., Inc. v. Hampton Intern. Commc'ns, 620 F.2d 7, 11 (2d
Cir. 1980). However, when the trademark has not been federal registered, the
plaintiff bears this burden of proving that its mark is not generic, due to the ab-
sence of the presumption of validity. Id.
31. Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Controls Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th
Cir. 1986). ("A generic term is one that is commonly used as the name of a kind
of goods.")
32. Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Ad-
ventists Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1989).
9
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ment, alleging that the defendant had used the plaintiffs mark
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST to describe its church. 33 The de-
fendant again asserted the defense of genericism. 34 As in McGill,
the defendant argued that the mark was generic because it referred
to the set of Christian beliefs, doctrines and standards, rather than
plaintiff's church.35 The court did not rule on the merits of whether
the mark was generic, but held that the defendant had properly
pled the affirmative defense in its answer, as to preclude a judg-
ment on the pleadings.36
c. Christian Science Board of Directors of the First Church
of Christ, Scientist v. Evans
In Christian Science Board of Directors of the First Church of
Christ, Scientist v. Evans, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found
that the names "Christian Science" or "Christian Science Church"
were generic and therefore not protectable as trademarks. In arriv-
ing at this decision, they took a different approach than the McGill
court.
37
In Evans, the plaintiff was the First Church of Christ, Scientist
(referred to as the "Mother Church" by the court) of the Christian
Science faith, a religion founded by Mary Baker Eddy in the 19th
century.38 The defendants were trustees of a church that was at one
time a branch of the Mother Church and therefore affiliated with
33. Id. at 229.
34. Id. at 231.
35. Id.
36. Id. The court in General Conference reviewed de novo a judgment on the
pleadings, and held that judgment was not proper because defendants had
properly plead the affirmative defense of genericism in its answer. Id. There-
fore, judgment on the pleadings was improper. Id.
37. Christian Science Bd. of Dir. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v.
Evans, 520 A.2d 1347 (N.J. 1987).
38. Id. at 1349. The court explained the organizational structure of the faith
as follows: The Mother Church is the center of the international Christian Sci-
ence community and is therefore given the formal name of the First Church of
Christ, Scientist. Id. Local branches of the church are smaller in size than the
Mother Church and are designated as "First Church of Christ, Scientist," fol-
lowed by a geographic description or other indication. Id.
218
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the plaintiff.3 9 The defendants, however, continued to use the
phrase "Christian Science" in connection with its organization af-
ter the split, spurring the trademark infringement claim that was
the crux of this case.40 The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
the terms in which the plaintiffs were attempting to secure trade-
mark rights and enforcement were generic and therefore not pro-
tectable.41
In an interesting take on the issue presented, the court was care-
ful to point out that the religion of Christian Science was founded
at least a decade before the Mother Church was founded. This
careful distinction emphasized the fact that the religion and its or-
ganization (The Mother Church) are conceptually separate and that
the religion was in existence before the organization.42
The court highlighted two essential policy reasons for its deci-
sion. First, the court reasoned because the term "Christian Sci-
ence" is the name of a religion, anyone practicing "Christian Sci-
ence" should be permitted to use the term "Christian Science in
connection with the name of a Church, and those not practicing the
religion should not be permitted to use the term in connection with
their religious organization or church." 43 Secondly, the court ex-
trapolated that because the defendant is practicing the Christian
Science Religion, it should be permitted to use the term in connec-
tion with the name of its church. 44 The court noted that the plain-
tiffs did not have the law on their side in their attempts to prohibit
the defendants from using the term "Christian Science" in connec-
tion with their church, since term has become the common-and
39. Id. Years after the defendant's branch was officially authorized as a
branch of the Mother Church, a theological schism occurred and the Mother
Church withdrew its "recognition" of the defendant's organization as an official
branch of the Mother Church, and ordered the defendants to cease using the
name "Christian Science" in connection with its organization. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1357.
42. Evans, 520 A.2d at 1349. The court noted that these facts were essential
to its reasoning in the case. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
219
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therefore generic-term used to describe any religion following
the teachings of Mary Baker Eddy.45
The court went on to say that just because the plaintiff's use of
the term has been relatively exclusive and unchallenged for a sub-
stantial amount of time, it does not lend weight to the argument
that the plaintiffs should be granted exclusive rights as to use of
the term; to do so would be against the fundamental objectives of
trademark law.46 The court also stressed that it must protect against
monopolies in generic terms in the religious products context just
as much, if not more, as in the commercial products and services
cases, highlighting the importance of this realm of cases and the
policy concerns implicated in each of these religious trademark
cases.
47
2. "Likelihood of Confusion " and the Religious Context
Treatment of likelihood of confusion has also varied among the
circuit courts, as demonstrated by Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky and
Lamparello v. Falwell. Both cases have somewhat analogous facts,
but produced diametrically opposed results, perhaps turning on the
content of the alleged infringer's materials.
45. Id. at 1352 (citingPrimal Feeling Center of New England, Inc. v. Janov,
201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 44 (T.T.A.B. 1978). Holding that the plaintiffs asserted
trademark in "Primal Therapy," a type of therapy that he had created as well as
named, was invalid, due to the fact that it was impossible to describe the therapy
without using the name "Primal Therapy." Id. at 50. Therefore, the TTAB con-
cluded that those individuals providing the therapy piloted by Dr. Janov had the
right to use the name "Primal Therapy" in conjunction with their services. Id. at
56.)
46. Evans, 520 A.2d at 1352. The court opined that the plaintiffs were essen-
tially attempting to remove a term from the public domain and gain exclusive
use as their own. Id. at 1352.
47. Id. at 1355.
220
12
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss1/7
2014] ELLER V, INTELLECTUAL RESERVE, INC. 221
a. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky
In Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, the plaintiff was a non-profit out-
reach ministry that was founded in 1973.48 The plaintiff claimed
that it held a common law service mark in "Jews for Jesus" based
on its continuous use of the mark in commerce for a substantial
amount of time, as well as the service mark "Jews fx r Jesus", with
the "0" of the word "for" being replaced with a stylized Star of
David.4950 The plaintiff claimed that the widespread use of its name
and marks had gained the mark significant recognition and that the
public recognized its name and marks as identifying the plaintiffs
religious organization and its associated mission and beliefs. 5' The
plaintiff also secured a domain name of "jews-for-jesus.org" in or-
der to promote its religious organization.52
The plaintiff sued a professional website developer and vocal
critic of the plaintiffs organization, for a violation of their trade-
mark rights pursuant to the Lanham Act. 53 At issue in the suit was
48. Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 288 (D.N.J. 1998). The
founders of the Jews for Jesus ministry founded their religious organization on
the belief that Jesus is the "Messiah of Israel" and the "savior of the World,"
and promoted this idea through education and religious camaraderie directed
towards Jews and non-Jews alike. Id. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs
organization employs 145 staff members, has twelve permanent branches
around the world, and 68 chapters perform voluntary activities on its behalf. Id.
49. Id. The plaintiff had owned and maintained a federally registered service
mark in this stylized version of its service mark since 1983. Id.
50. The court also emphasized the plaintiffs broad information dissemina-
tion efforts, including four publications that it distributes around the United
States, as well as numerous other mediums of dissemination, including classes,
meetings, television and radio broadcasts, magazines, brochures, and newspa-
pers. Id. at 289. The plaintiff has also spent a considerable amount of time and
money in creating and distributing advertising campaigns for its religious teach-
ings and organization. Id. However, the plaintiff has conceded that not every
single piece of literature or other material that it distributed contained the styl-
ized mark. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 290. The plaintiff maintained that the domain name did not contain
the stylized "0" in the word "for," nor did it contain spaces in the domain name
because such characters are not recognized in internet domain names. Id.
53. Id.
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a website created by the defendant with the domain name 'jews-
forjesus.org."5 4
In determining whether the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the
merits of the case, 55 the court held that the plaintiff had successful-
ly demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.5 6 The court
found that the plaintiff owned a valid and legally protectable mark,
and the defendant's use of a similar mark in conjunction with its
website was likely to cause confusion as to the source of the web-
site and related content.57 Defendant relied on Blinded Veterans in
54. Jews For Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 290. The defendant's website contained
about one page of text referring to the plaintiffs organization as "Jews for Je-
sus," without the stylized mark. Id. The defendant stated that his purpose behind
creating his website was to "intercept potential converts before they have a
chance to see the obscene garbage on the real J4J site." Id. at 291, (quoting Ex-
hibit J to the Complaint). The defendant also repeatedly referred to his own
website as bogus. Id. at 286. The website contained a disclaimer that stated
"PLEASE NOTE This website is an independent project which reflects the per-
sonal opinion of its owner, and is in no way affiliated with the Jewish organiza-
tion Outreach Judaism, or the Christian organization Jews for Jesus." Id. at 290
n. 13 (quoting Exhibit E to the Complaint) (emphasis in original). The website
also contained a clickable link that transported users to the internet site for the
Outreach Judaism Organization, another "vocal opponent" of Jews for Jesus. Id.
at 290-91. The court pointed out that the website for the Outreach Judaism Or-
ganization was commercial in nature in that one of the sections of the website
sold certain items relating to the teaching of the Outreach Judaism Organization.
55. The plaintiff in Jews for Jesus sought a preliminary injunction. Id. at
287. The court articulated that, in order for injunctive relief to be proper, the
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating 1) the likelihood of the plaintiff pre-
vailing on the merits at the final hearing, 2) the extent to which the plaintiff is
being irreparably harmed by the defendant's activities, 3) the extent to which the
defendant will experience irreparable harm if the injunctive relief is granted, and
4) the public interests involved in granting the injunctive relief. Id.
56. Id. at 305.
57. In regards to the likelihood of confusion as to the federally registered
service mark, the court held that the defendant's use of the domain name was
confusingly similar to the plaintiff's mark and therefore was likely to constitute
infringement on the merits. Id. at 296. In deciding so, the court reasoned that in
order to constitute infringement, exact similarities are not required between the
senior mark and the one allegedly infringing upon such mark. Id. The court in-
stead stated that in order for a finding of infringement, the marks must be con-
fusingly similar or used to deceive the public, further stating that two marks are
confusingly similar if ordinary consumers may incorrectly assume that the two
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arguing that the common law service mark "Jews for Jesus" was
generic and therefore not entitled to trademark protection.58
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument for a finding of ge-
nericism.19 In articulating the standard for a generic term, the court
stated that a term is generic "if that term has 'so few alternatives
(perhaps none) for describing the good [or service] that to allow
someone to monopolize the word would debilitate competitors.'"60
The court rejected the analogy to Blinded Veterans, stating that the
cases were distinguishable because there was ample evidence
demonstrating that the plaintiff has consistently used the term
"Jews for Jesus" to refer to the organization, and not its practition-
ers.
61
marks share a common "source, affiliation, connection, or sponsorship." Id.
(quoting Fisons Horticulture Inc., v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 477 (3d
Cir. 1994)). However, in its reasoning, the court fails to mention the defend-
ant's stated objective in creating the website, to intercept potential seekers of the
plaintiff's site, and instead based its reasoning on a bare and unsupported asser-
tion that consumers will likely inappropriately assume that the defendant's web-
site is affiliated with or otherwise endorsed by the plaintiffs organization be-
cause the names are almost identical. Id. However, the court fails to recognize
that once any potential consumers reach the website, any such assumptions held
by said consumers will be proven false, as the content on the defendant's web-
site is in opposition to and in critique of those beliefs held by the plaintiff's or-
ganization.
58. Jews for Jesus, 993 F.Supp at 297. In arguing that the plaintiffs common
law service mark was generic, the defendant analogizes to the decision handed
down by the D.C. Circuit in Blinded Veterans Ass 'n v. Blinded American Veter-
ans Found. (Where the court held that the common law (and therefore unregis-
tered) mark BLINDED VETERANS was generic because the organization used
the term "blinded veterans" numerous times to refer to soldiers who had lost
their sight, instead of the actual organization itself. Jews for Jesus at 298, citing
to Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded American Veterans Found., 872 F.2d
1035, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court also went on to state that it would be
hard to designate another term for the public to refer to the category of people
who were both blind and veterans. Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1041).
59. Jews for Jesus, 933 F. Supp at 297.
60. Id. (alteration in the original) (quoting Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic
Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1442 (3d Cir. 1994)).
61. Id. Additionally, the court further distinguished Blind Veterans by noting
that there are many other terms available for the public to use in order to refer to
Jews who believe in Jesus Christ. Id.
223
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The Jews for Jesus court also assessed the likelihood of confu-
sion created or potentially created by the defendant's use of the
mark.62 The court determined that, based on an extensive analysis
of the Scott Factors, which are used by the Third Circuit in as-
sessing likelihood of confusion, the defendant's use of the mark in
conjunction with his website was likely to cause confusion because
a majority of the factors weighed in favor of a likelihood of confu-
sion.63 Therefore, the court held, the plaintiff had successfully
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.64
b. Lamparello v. Falwell
In order to contextualize Jews for Jesus, the Fourth Circuit case
of Lamparello v. Falwell provides an interesting, and distinguisha-
ble, case from Jews for Jesus but with similar base facts.65 In Lam-
parello, the defendant created a website66 criticizing the plaintiff
Jerry Falwel67, a nationally known minister who expressed con-
62. Id. at 301. In assessing likelihood of confusion, the court used the Third
Circuit Scott Factors. Id. Those factors include "1) the degree of similarity be-
tween the owner's mark and the alleged infringing mark; 2) the strength of own-
er's mark; 3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and
attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; 4) the length of time
the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; 5)
the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; 6) the evidence of actual con-
fusion; 7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through the
same channels of trade and advertised through the same media; 8) the extent to
which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same; 9) the relationship of
the goods in the minds of the public because of the similarity of function; [and]
10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior
owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's market." Id. See Scott Paper
Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 305.
65. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005).
66. The court refers to the defendant's website as a "gripe site." Id. at 311.
67. Christopher Lamparello actually sought declaratory judgment that he was
not in violation of Jerry Falwell's trademark rights, making Lamparello the de
facto plaintiff. Id. at 312. For clarity's sake, Lamparello shall be referred to as
the defendant throughout this discussion, because it was his actions that were
potentially infringing.
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troversial ideas about homosexuals and homosexuality.68 The
plaintiff had several common law trademarks in "Jerry Falwell"
and "Falwell," and maintained a website for his ministry at
"www.falwell.com."69 The defendant registered the domain name
"www.fallwell.com" and used this website as a platform from
which to respond to and criticize the plaintiffs views about homo-
sexuality.70 In response to several cease and desist letters sent by
the plaintiff and his representative, the defendant filed suit, seeking
declaratory judgment of noninfringment. 7|
Upon review, the Fourth Circuit articulated that to be successful
in a cause of action for infringement, the plaintiff must demon-
strate 1) that it possesses a mark, 2) that the defendant has used the
mark, 3) that the defendant's use of the mark occurred in com-
merce, 4) that the defendant used the mark in connection with the
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services, and 5) that
the defendant used the mark in a way that was likely to cause con-
fusion among customers.72 The Fourth Circuit refers to these five
factors that assess likelihood of confusion as the Pizzeria Uno Fac-
tors.73 The court ultimately held that the defendant's gripe site was
not likely to cause confusion among consumers. 74
68. Id. at 311.
69. Id.
70. Id. The defendant's website contained a disclaimer on the homepage
disowning any affiliation or other association with the plaintiffs ministry as
well as a link to the plaintiffs website for patrons who inadvertently accessed
the defendant's website, Id. The defendant's website also contained a clickable
link to amazon.com, where visitors were directed to a page selling a book that
supported the defendant's interpretation of the Bible and homosexuality. Id.
71. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 312. On summary judgment, the district court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Jerry Falwell. Id.
72. Id. at 313. In assessing likelihood of confusion, the Fourth Circuit utiliz-
es (and did so in Lamparello) the Pizzeria Uno Factors. Id. at 314-15. See Piz-
zeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984). The relevant
factors include 1) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark, 2) the similarity of
the marks, 3) the similarity of the goods and/or services that the two marks are
being used to identify, 4) the similarity of the facilities used by the parties in
connection with their goods/services, 5) similarity of advertising, 6) the poten-
tial infringer's intent, and 7) actual confusion. Id. at 315.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Although the court looked at all of the Pizzeria Uno factors, the
most relevant to this discussion are the similarity of goods and ser-
vices and actual confusion. The court noted that the two sites did
not offer similar goods and services and that, in fact, the views
presented by each site are in absolute opposition to one another."
The court opined that because the two websites offered such dif-
fering views, users attempting to access the plaintiffs site who in-
stead inadvertently encountered the defendant's gripe site would
not believe that the plaintiff would endorse, create, or otherwise
sponsor a website criticizing his own religious teachings. 76 In other
words, the court posited that the consumers were intelligent
enough to distinguish between the two websites. Furthermore, the
court reasoned, there was actual anecdotal evidence of internet us-
ers who came across the defendant's website while looking for the
plaintiffs website, soon thereafter realized that the plaintiff was
not the source of such website.77 Therefore, the court concluded,
there was no likelihood of confusion.78
III. ELLER CASE SUMMARY
Eller v. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas on April 7, 2014. 79
Plaintiff, Jonathan Eller, seeks declaratory judgment and a prelim-
inary judgment regarding his use of the word "Mormon" to pro-
mote his Mormon-centered online dating site, Mormon Match, as
well as use in his domain name for the same. Defendant, Intellec-
tual Reserve, Inc. ("Intellectual Reserve") filed counterclaims as-
serting that Eller has committed violations of trademark and unfair
competition law, both in the federal and common law domains; fi-
75. Id.
76. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 315; see also New Kids on the Block v. News
Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that when a
mark is used by someone other than the markholder to criticize the markholder,
this use implies that the use is not sponsored by the senior markholder).
77. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 315.
78. Id.
79. Complaint at 1, Eller v. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29,
2014) (No. 4:14-cv-00914).
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nally, Intellectual Reserve sought declaratory judgment regarding
Eller's use of MORMON. 80
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff, Jonathan Eller, is the founder of Mormon Match, an
online dating service which is geared towards helping members of
the Mormon Church meet significant others who share similar re-
ligious faith and beliefs.81 The domain name for Mormon Match is
www.dateamormon.com.82 Eller sought federal trademark registra-
tion for the mark MORMON MATCH as well as Mormon Match's
logo, and sought to apply the registration of these marks for "In-
ternet-based dating, social introduction, and social networking ser-
vices."83
Intellectual Reserve, Inc. is a "non-profit Utah Corporation hold-
ing intellectual property used by The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints." 84 The Church is more commonly known as the
80. Capitalization of a word throughout this article will denote the trademark
or group of trademarks at issue.
81. Complaint at 30-32. Eller describes himself as a Mormon and an "active
member of the Church in full fellowship." Id. at 27.
82. Id. at 31-32. Eller alleges that he created this website and dating service
to serve as a safe, comfortable, and convenient forum for members of the Mor-
mon Church to meet and facilitate "relationships, dating, and marriages between
Mormon users of his website." Id. Since this time the website has used the do-
main name of wwww.dateamormon.com, as well as has displayed Mormon
Match's logo, a background image of the Salt Lake City Temple, and made oth-
er and numerous usages of the word "Mormon" in a variety of contexts. Id. at
39-40. Eller maintains that since the website was activated in June of 2006 and
that he never received any cease and desist letters or any other correspondence
for that member from the Intellectual Reserve or any authority members of the
Church informing him that he could not use the word Mormon to promote his
dating website. Id. at 40.
83. Complaint at 42. Eller's final trademark application did not claim trade-
mark in MORMON MATCH, only the design elements of the site. Id. at 43-44.
On October 29, 2013, Eller's trademark application was published for opposi-
tion in the Official Gazette, a weekly publication in which the United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office publishes newly registered trademarks. Id. at 45.
84. Id. at 2; see also Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims at 2,
Eller v. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2014) (No. 4:14-cv-
00914).
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Mormon Church, and Intellectual Reserve holds claims to trade-
marks in several marks incorporating the word MORMON. 85 The
Church has had a federally registered trademark in the word
MORMON since May 8, 2007.86 Intellectual Reserve asserts that
all of the Mormon marks it has federally registered have been
deemed incontestable.87
On January 4, 2014, Intellectual Reserve filed a Notice of Oppo-
sition, asserting ownership of all right, title, and interest in the
trademark MORMON. 8 Eller alleges that none of the aforemen-
tioned marks are claimed for goods and services similar to those in
which his trademark is registered9 and that the Intellectual Re-
serve was denied trademark in the word MORMON. 90
Eller sought declaratory judgment in regard to his use of the
word "Mormon" in conjunction with his internet dating site, as
well as declaratory judgment that MORMON is a generic and/or
descriptive mark and therefore the Church has no rights in the
mark.91 Eller's believed that his use of MORMON and other pur-
portedly trademarked images does not constitute infringement of
any rights purported by Intellectual Reserve or the Mormon
Church92 . Furthermore, Eller sought enjoinment of Intellectual Re-
serve from interfering or otherwise attempting to restrict or other-
85. Affirmative Defenses at 10. Intellectual Reserve's trademarks incorpo-
rate the word MORMON alone or in combination with other words, as well as
design marks involving or otherwise depicting the temple located in Salt Lake
City, Utah. Id.
86. Id. at 15.
87. Id. at 16.
88. Complaint at 47. Intellectual Reserve asserted that this mark is an unreg-
istered common law mark protected for an "unspecified variety of goods and
services" as well as several additional federally registered marks all related to
the Church and its products/services. Id. at 47-50. The additional federally reg-
istered trademarks that Eller claimed the Intellectual Reserve identified included
MORMON, MORMON.ORG, BOOK OF MORMON, MORMON
TABERNACLE CHOIR, MORMON TABERNACLE CHOIR (and Design),
MORMON HANDICRAFT, and MORMON HANDICRAFT. See Id. at 50.
89. See Id. at 51. Eller's mark is filed under Section 45, "Internet-based da-
ting, social introduction, and social networking services."
90. Id. at 51-52.
91. Id. at 105-110.
92. Id. at 17.
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wise interfere with Eller's operation and control of his Internet-
based dating site. 93
Intellectual Reserve filed five counterclaims alleging that, Eller
infringed on its trademark and violated several provisions of feder-
al copyright law.94 Furthermore, Eller's use of these marks has cre-
ated a likelihood of confusion among "actual and prospective cus-
tomers" and that this likelihood of confusion has damaged the
goodwill of the MORMON marks. 95
VI. ANALYSIS
It seems as though there is little to no consistency with which
the various court's examination of religious trademarks. Why did
the McGill court hold that the plaintiffs mark was not generic and
did not create a likelihood of confusion, while the Evans court in
examining strikingly similar facts, held that the plaintiffs mark
was generic?
A. Varying Interpretations of Religious Trademarks
One possible explanation for the variety of religious trade-
mark interpretations may be certain circuits' tendencies to provide
an implicit (or explicit) bias to plaintiffs who hold religious trade-
marks. It seems as though in some circuits, the courts are unwilling
(whether consciously choosing to be so or not) to place the same
93. Complaint at 17.
94. Answer at 47-79. Intellectual Reserve's counterclaim asserts that Eller
engaged in trademark infringement in violation of federal law pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a). Counterclaim at 49. Furthermore, Intellectual Reserve al-
leged that Eller has used Intellectual Reserve's marks in an infringing manner in
connection with Eller's Internet-based dating site. Id. at 48.
95. See Complaint. Eller filed his Complaint at Law in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas on April 7, 2014. On April 29,
2014, Intellectual Reserve filed its Answer as well as the counterclaims against
Eller described above. See Answer; Counterclaims. On June 20, 2014, the par-
ties filed a notice of settlement, the terms of which remain undisclosed to the
public at this time. Bill Donahue, Mormon Dating Site Settles Trademark Spat
with LDS Church, LAW 360 (June 20, 2014, 2:46 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/550306/mormon-dating-site-settles-trademark-
spat-with-lds-church.
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evidentiary burdens as are placed on secular litigants. When exam-
ining such cases, it appears as though the court does not scrutinize
the evidence put forth for likelihood of confusion and against ge-
nericism at the same level that it does for secular litigants. Some
critics have alleged that the court in McGill failed to properly and
neutrally apply trademark law to the facts in McGill.96 N. Cameron
Russell, in his examination of domain names in the religious con-
text, critiques the court's decision that the relevant consuming
public viewed the plaintiffs mark as referring to the religious or-
ganization, rather than the "goods" offered by the religious organi-
zation (i.e. the producer rather than the product). 97
There is also a difference in the way in which the courts exam-
ine likelihood of confusion as well. Although Jews for Jesus and
Lamparello both dealt with non-secular plaintiffs, there was one
glaring difference in the court's interpretation: both the defendants
in these cases maintained gripe sites that criticized the plaintiff's
religious beliefs. In Lamparello, the court emphasized this feature
of the website, stating that any likelihood of confusion was simply
absent due to the fact that the defendant's site was critical of the
plaintiff's beliefs. However, this analysis is absent from Jews for
Jesus. The disparities in these cases are harder to explain because
both cases dealt with non-secular litigants, but the inconsistences
between the courts' interpretation are conspicuous.
It is well-settled and fundamental principle of law in our nation-
al jurisdiction that when presiding over a matter concerning a reli-
gious property dispute, the court may not "take sides" and must
take great efforts to avoid ruling based on religious doctrine.98
96. N. Cameron Russell, Allocation of New Top-Level Domain Names and
the Effect upon Religious Freedom, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 697,
709 (2013).
97. Russell notes that customer surveys are often employed in trademark in-
fringement cases, and that if members of the relevant public were administered
surveys regarding the significance of the plaintiffs purported trademark, it
seems "unlikely" that the majority would answer that it was the religious organ-
ization itself. Id. , Russell seems to be implying that the McGill court was im-
proper in its decision that the plaintiff's term was not generic.
98. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§9:7.50 (4th ed. 2014) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can.
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)). See also Nat'l Spiritual Assembly of the
230
22
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss1/7
2014] ELLER V. INTELLECTUAL RESERVE, INC. 231
However, the examination of the relevant precedents has been in-
strumental in revealing the inconsistencies of the court's applica-
tion of the trademark rules and tests to religious organizations and
their affiliates. McGill suggests the court's unwillingness to place
such the burden required of secular plaintiffs to demonstrate a like-
lihood of confusion. Although there is a clear mandate for reli-
gious neutrality and impartiality, some courts are taking these
principles too far and perhaps lightening the burden on religious
plaintiffs attempting to secure rights in trademarks that would not
otherwise be protected if not for their religious affiliations.
B. Eller: A Meritorious Case?
Although Eller was settled and the District Court was not re-
quired to issue a written ruling on the merits of the case, it is com-
pelling to examine the case law in the realm of religion and trade-
mark, and analyze what may have happened if the merits of the
case had been heard by the court. The ultimate question is whether
Intellectual Reserve's counterclaims in Eller had a likelihood of
success on the merits, and whether a decision in Intellectual Re-
serve's favor would have pushed the boundaries of trademark law
in the religious context.
The facts of the Eller case and the Mormon Church's proclama-
tion that it owns trademarks in such words and symbols associated
with the Church raise several questions, all relating back to one
main inquiry: Does the Mormon Church have a valid counterclaim
against Eller's use of the word Mormon in connection with his In-
ternet dating site? Could Eller have pushed the outer-limits of
trademarkable religious marks?
Bahd'is of the U.S. Under Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat'l Spiritual As-
sembly of the Bahdi'is of the U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying
the fundamental principle that courts must remain neutral in adjudicating church
property disputes to trademark disputes). In National Spiritual Assembly, the
court was required to decide a forty-year-old trademark dispute between two
religious organizations, one of which had split and formed a schism from the
other. Id. at 840. The court stressed that in analyzing and deciding upon such a
case, courts must be cautious as to not take sides in the religious schism and to
use the neutral application of the law to determine the resolution to the legal
dispute. Id. at 845.
23
DiJohn: Examining the Outer-Limits of Trademark Law in the Religious Cont
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXV: 209
It is essential to note that the purpose of this treatment of trade-
mark in the religious context is not to make the assertion that a re-
ligious organization cannot or should not be afforded the right to
obtain, own, and enforce its right as to any trademarks or other in-
tellectual property. In fact, courts have observed that nothing in the
Constitution prohibits religious organizations from owning proper-
ty, intellectual or otherwise, nor "prohibits the government from
protecting that property from unlawful appropriation by others." 9
In other words, religious organizations are, or at least should be,
treated the same as nonreligious organizations with regards to their
intellectual property rights and their right to enforce these private
causes of action. However, Eller focuses on the Church's claim
that it holds an exclusive right to use the word "Mormon," which
the majority of people use to describe the Church and all of its
proffered religious services.
Eller alleged that his purpose in creating Mormon Match was to
create a forum in which members of the Mormon Church could
meet, interact, and create loving relationships with other members
who share the same religious beliefs and ideals.100 It seems unlike-
ly, and Intellectual Reserve has provided little evidence to the con-
trary, that Eller created his site with the intention of unfairly and
inappropriately capitalizing off of the Mormon Church. Addition-
ally, Eller's website contains a disclaimer that reads "MORMON
MATCH IS NOT COMMERCIALLY AFFILIATED WITH OR
ENDORSED BY THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
99. Nat'l Bd. of Young Women's Christian Ass'n of U.S.A. v. Young Wom-
en's Christian Ass'n of Charleston, S.C., 335 F. Supp. 615, 625 (D.S.C. 1971)
(holding that granting a religious organization the exclusive use of a name only
deprives other religious groups of the use of that same name and that such ex-
clusivity does not deny other religious organizations the right to establish com-
peting organizations with the same purpose but with different names); see also
Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Perez, 97 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1164 (S.D. Fl. 2000) (holding that it is a well-established principle of law
that religious organizations are entitled to the same amount of protection for
their trademarks, copyright, and other intellectual property as are commercial
enterprises; furthermore, enforcement of the Act in the religious context does
not "abridge the religious freedom rights" of a group who is legitimately in-
fringing upon another's valid trademarks).
100. Complaint at 8-9.
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LATTER-DAY SAINTS." 1°0 People should be permitted to trade-
mark use of the name of the religion in a non-reputation harming
way, even if they may not be entitled to immunity from trademark
infringement through the fair use defense. Uses such as Eller's do
not harm the Mormon Church; in fact, it could be argued that such
uses help promote the Mormon Church's ideals, theology, and be-
liefs, in that it helps raise public awareness and a positive image of
the Mormon Church.
In Eller, the goods purported to be distributed by Intellectual
Reserve and the Church present a quandary in determining wheth-
er their group of Mormon trademarks are actually performing a
trademark function. The specific goods and the Church is distrib-
uting under these trademarks do not fit the traditional categories of
consumer products. It is necessary to decide whether the Church's
claimed trademarks in the word MORMON and associated terms,
as well whether as the image of the Temple, is capable of, and ac-
tually does, perform a trademark function.
1. Eller's Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Although Eller v. Intellectual Reserve was settled, an examina-
tion of Intellectual Reserve's likelihood of success on the merits of
its trademark infringement counterclaims is still relevant.
a. Valid Mark
In Eller, the goods purported to be distributed by Intellectual
Reserve and the Church present a dilemma in determining whether
their group of MORMON trademarks are actually performing a
trademark function. It is seemingly more difficult to define what
exactly the goods or services provided by the Church whether the
Church's claimed trademarks in the word MORMON and associ-
ated terms, as well whether as the image of the Temple, is capable
101. MORMON MATCH, https://dateamormon.com/ (last visited July 21,
2014). However, it is important to note that this website was accessed after the
June 2014 settlement. As the settlement terms are as of this date, unknown, the
disclaimer may have been incident to the settlement of this matter. See Do-
nahue, supra note 95.
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of, and actually do, perform a trademark function. Therefore, the
issue becomes whether the MORMON marks are generic.
Under the test generecism articulated in McGill and applied to
the facts of Eller, the court must ascertain whether the general
consuming public views the marks as referring to the set of reli-
gious beliefs held by the religious organization. If the general pub-
lic views the marks are referring to the religious doctrine taught by
the religious organization (i.e. as reference to a product), then the
marks will be determined to be generic. On the other hand, if the
public views the marks as referring to the religious organization
itself, the source of the goods (i.e. as reference to the producer),
then the mark will not be held to be generic.10 2 if it can be demon-
strated that the general consuming public views the marks as refer-
ring to the "goods" (Mormon beliefs, doctrines, morals, etc.) rather
than the Mormon Church itself, then the MORMON marks should
be found generic. If this were the case, analysis stops here, as the
Mormon Church does not have a viable claim due to lack of a val-
id trademark. However, if the converse is true, and the public does
view these marks as referring to the Mormon Church itself, the
analysis continues as to whether Eller's use of the mark is likely to
cause confusion.
Additionally, if analyzed under the framework of Evans, it
seems as though Eller would not have been found liable for in-
fringing Intellectual Reserve's MORMON Marks. As discussed
supra, the Evans court held that when it is impossible to discuss or
otherwise name the plaintiffs religion without using the plaintiff's
purported mark, that mark has been deemed generic and therefore
is not protected by trademark law. °3 Additionally, the Evans court
articulated that if someone is practicing the religion, he or she has
the right to use the religious name in connection with its goods and
services. 10 4 Therefore, because Eller is a practicing Mormon, and
"Mormon" is the name of a religion, Eller should be permitted to
102. McGill, 617 F. 3d at 416.
103. See Russell, supra note 96 at 709.
104. See Evans, 520 A.2d at 1355.
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use the word Mormon in conjunction with the goods and/or ser-
vices that he is marketing to the public. 105
b. Likelihood of Confusion
In order to be successful in a trademark infringement claim, the
plaintiff must also demonstrate that there is a likelihood of confu-
sion caused by the defendant's use of the mark.10 6 Traditionally,
the courts apply several factors when analyzing whether a defend-
ant's mark is likely to cause confusion. In the 5th Circuit, courts
apply the Roto-Rooter factors.10 7
Although the 5th Circuit has not (yet) specifically applied these
factors to the religious context, other federal District Courts and
Circuit Courts of Appeal have. 08 In McGill, the 6th Circuit held
that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark, SEVENTH-DAY
ADVENTIST, was likely to cause confusion based on the similari-
ty of each party's relative services and the close similarity of the
marks. 109
105. This statement excludes the use of such mark in a disparaging, dilutive,
or other damaging manner. Such causes of action are beyond the scope of this
treatment.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
107. Roto-Rooter 513 F.2d at 45. Likelihood of confusion is assessed by ex-
amining the following non-exclusive factors: 1) the type of trademark at issue,
2) similarity of design, 3) similarity of product, 4) identity of retail outlets and
purchasers, 5) identity of advertising media utilized, 6) defendant's intent, and
7) actual confusion. Id. The court in Roto-Rooter made sure to emphasize that
although proof of actual confusion is not necessary for a finding of likelihood of
confusion and subsequent liability for trademark infringement, the court views
the factor of actual confusion as the most important and as the best evidence of
likelihood of confusion. Id. at 45-46.
108. See McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (holding that a breakaway church's use of the
mark SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST was likely to cause confusion because of
the relatedness of the parties' services and similarity of the marks).
109. Id. at 416. The factors the court assessed in McGill to determined like-
lihood of confusion were 1) the strength of the senior mark, 2) relatedness of the
goods and services, 3) similarity of the marks, 4) evidence of actual confusion,
5) the marketing channels used, 6) likely degree of purchaser care, 7) the intent
of the defendant in selecting the mar, and 8) the likelihood of expansion of the
product lines. Id.
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Of the Roto-Rooter factors as applied in McGill, the most rele-
vant would be relatedness of the goods and services, and likely de-
gree of purchaser care. First, the service provided by Mormon
Match is just that: an online forum and dating site tailored towards
those involved in the Mormon Church. Intellectual Reserve, by
way of the Mormon Church, provides no such service or product
to the members of the Mormon congregation. In fact, the Mormon
Church's products are its teachings, philosophies, doctrines, which
it shares with its congregation and preaches to its believers. The
difference between the two products is great, with this factor
weighing heavily in favor of Eller's use being permitted. Because
there is no similarity at all between the products, current and po-
tential consumers are not likely to be confused as to the source of
Eller's dating service being the Mormon Church or Intellectual
Reserve.
Additionally, the degree of purchaser care weighs in favor of
Eller. It is likely that those individuals using Eller's dating website
are devoted members of the Mormon Church. They are likely to
know that the Mormon Church is not officially affiliated with
Eller's dating website; Intellectual Reserve has provided no evi-
dence of actual confusion. Intellectual Reserve has made bare as-
sertions that Eller's website is likely to cause confusion among
prospective customers.I 10
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Although Eller v. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. settled, this is not the
end of religious organizations asserting their right to certain
trademarks and disputing the use of these trademarks. This litiga-
tion is particularly relevant among the relatively recently estab-
lished faiths, such as the Mormon Church and Scientology"'l, as
110. Eller v. Intellectual Reserve, No. 14 CV 00914 (S.D. Tex. May 12,
2014), counterclaims at 77, (where Intellectual Reserve does not refute claims
that dateamormon.com contains the word "Mormon" and simply alleges that
such fact causes confusion or is an infringement of their trademark).
111. See Church of Scientology Intern. V. Elmira Mission of the Church of
Scientology, 794 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (litigation concerning the Church of
Scientology's asserted trademark in the mark SCIENTOLOGY).
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opposed to religions, such as the Judeo-Christian religions, which
pre-date the founding of America. Eller's significance, had it
reached the trial stage, could have helped to shape and determine
the limitations of religion and trademark. The Mormon Church has
over 15,000,000 members." ' 2 Allowing the Mormon Church the
exclusive right to use the MORMON marks in conjunction with
goods and services limits access to those who practice the religion
and wish to use the mark in connection with their goods and ser-
vices. Additionally, this potential exclusivity would remove use of
the mark from not only competitors, but also from those who have
the desire to market products that are in alignment with the Mor-
mon Church's doctrines. An Eller decision could have determined
whether religious organizations may have the exclusive right to
trademark something as unremarkable as a colloquialism (i.e.
"Mormon" to describe the beliefs of those in the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints).
Eller exemplifies the limitations that could be imposed on a
wide number of individuals if any sizeable religious organization
is given the opportunity to trademark such colloquialisms. If this
right were given, it could potentially lead to the exploitation of the
licensing, and lead to loyalists of the Church being exploited or
otherwise completely unable to use the name to promote their
products that are touting the ideals of the religion. Why should re-
ligious organizations be entitled to the exclusive use of the name of
the religion when there are other who may want to use the name in
connection with their goods and services in a non-reputation harm-
ing way? There are other individuals and corporations, such Jona-
than Eller who have a need to use the names of such religions in a
legitimate, non-disparaging trademark manner. Such individuals
should not have the constant threat of litigation hanging over their
heads. Some critics have noted that entitling a religious organiza-
tion to the exclusive trademark rights creates a sort of monopoly,
seemingly in direct contradiction to trademark law."3 If Intellectu-
112. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Statistical Report, 2013,
https://www.lds.org/general-conference/2014/04/statistical-report-2013 (last vis-
ited July 10, 2014).
113. Russell, supra note 81, at 708. Russell notes that customer surveys are
often employed in trademark infringement cases, and that if members of the rel-
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al Reserve is entitled to exclusive trademark rights, this would on-
ly lead to a further perpetuation of this monopoly and seemingly
render many of the Lanham Act's protections useless. Such reli-
gious marks should only be protected if they truly deserve to be
protected under the law, and the courts must be compelled to apply
the same standards to non-secular litigants as secular litigants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Trademark enthusiasts and religious leaders alike were hoping
that Eller would help in setting the outer boundaries of trademark
vis - a - vis religion. However, due to the case settling, interested
parties will have to speculate as to what the result may have been
as they wait for another case ripe for the issue. Based on an exam-
ination of the relevant precedent, it seems as though Intellectual
Reserve would not have prevailed in its counterclaims against
Eller, and Eller would have been allowed to continue using the
marks in connection with his online dating service.
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